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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="nlm-ta">IEREK Press</journal-id>
      <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">10.21625</journal-id>
      <journal-title>IEREK Press</journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">2537-0154</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2537-0162</issn><publisher>
      	<publisher-name>IEREK Press</publisher-name>
      </publisher>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21625/archive.v4i2.754</article-id>
      <article-categories>
        <subj-group subj-group-type="heading">
          <subject>Research Article</subject>
        </subj-group>
        <Keywords><Keyword>Urban megaprojects</Keyword><Keyword>development</Keyword><Keyword>competitiveness</Keyword><Keyword>management</Keyword><Keyword>governance</Keyword><Keyword>sustainability</Keyword><Keyword>urban prosperity</Keyword></Keywords>
      </article-categories>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Urban Megaprojects as Disorderly and Unruly Endeavors</article-title><subtitle> </subtitle></title-group>
      <contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author">
	<name name-style="western">
	<surname>Santamaría</surname>
		<given-names>Gerardo del Cerro </given-names>
	</name>
	<aff>U.S. Fulbright Award Recipient (Urban Planning), New York & Visiting Scholar, London School of Economics</aff>
	</contrib></contrib-group>		
      <pub-date pub-type="ppub">
        <month>12</month>
        <year>2020</year>
      </pub-date>
      <pub-date pub-type="epub">
        <day>30</day>
        <month>12</month>
        <year>2020</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>4</volume>
      <issue>2</issue>
      <permissions>
        <copyright-statement>© 2020 © 2020 The Authors. Published by IEREK press. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</copyright-statement>
        <copyright-year>2020</copyright-year>
        <license license-type="open-access" xlink:href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/"><p>This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.</p></license>
      </permissions>
      <related-article related-article-type="companion" vol="2" page="e235" id="RA1" ext-link-type="pmc">
			<article-title>Urban Megaprojects as Disorderly and Unruly Endeavors</article-title>
      </related-article>
	  <abstract abstract-type="toc">
		<p>
			Megaprojects have multiplied around the world as an urban response to the pressures of neoliberalism and globalization in favor of development, competitiveness and innovation. The protagonists of the megaprojects adopt a narrative of international competitiveness, framing a discourse dominated by the rhetoric of economic survival. The response has been urban transformations in which governments and private sector actors have struggled to position their cities and services within a global socio-political division of labor, production and consumption, and to coordinate their local networks with the requirements perceived or real aspects of an increasingly deregulated and neoliberal international economic system. It seems clear, then, that the phenomenon of megaprojects is intrinsically linked to the logic of growth, development, qualitative urban transformation, wealth creation, competitiveness and prosperity. One of the consequences of this overall framework is that megaprojects usually evolve from an orderly planning project to a disorderly an unruly endeavor. The complexities of construction, operation, management and governance of large projects entail a series of stochastic processes where risk and unpredictability become fundamental components of urban economic life.
		</p>
		</abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body><sec>
			<title>1. Introduction</title>
				<p >Over the last three decades, many of the large-scale
urban interventions carried out by the public administration, in collaboration
with private interests, have taken place outside the usual or traditional
planning framework.Strategic
planning, increasingly common in cities around the world, reflects the
influence of globalization in achieving major changes in the institutional
structure, processes, influence and scope of urban planning, as has been
observedby Friedmann(2005).</p><p >Although both the state and developers try toclarify the design, planning and
construction of megaprojects, civil society still perceives these great
developments as full of secrecy, and this contributes to strengthening
opposition initiatives and movements (del Cerro Santamaría, 2013).</p><p >"Introverted modes of governance that circumvent
local planning frameworks, traditional democratic channels of participation,
and any accountability are frequently observed" (Harris, 2017, 41).</p><p >Land use plans can play an important role in guiding real
estate markets and ensuring “adequate allocation of public resources as a major
contributor to the ability of cities to promote growth through urban
megaprojects and equitably distribute their costs and benefits” (del Cerro
Santamaría, 2013, 25).</p><p >Urban megaprojects are generally developed as
public-private partnerships “with major impacts on the de facto privatization
of planning;and they tend to be
geared towards growth and competition rather than socially progressive ends.In general, there is a minimal
commitment to public benefit or socially just policies arising from a primary
focus on profitability” (Harris, 2017, 45).</p><p >From this point of view, urban megaprojects represent the
paradigm of the entrepreneurial city and present most of the problems of this
model of urban governance.</p><p >One of the most important issues in urban megaprojects is
the financing mechanism, especially for the initial costs that correspond to
the first phases of cleaning, decontamination of the soil, elimination of
physical barriers and the creation of the necessary infrastructures.In addition, high investment costs,
low expectations of returns, and considerable risks incurred during the early
stages make private sector involvement unlikely.Despite the anti-statist and
pro-market rhetoric of neoliberalism, the public powers facilitate (with
notorious expenses) the private sector undertaking of their businesses, and
without requiring a fair distribution of the benefits, a formula already known
and burdensome for the public interests.</p><p >The public sector, therefore, has to frequently be in
charge of regenerating and preparing land for the redevelopment required by
urban megaprojects.And yet, given
the limited financing capacity and tight public budgets of most municipalities
and metropolitan regions, finding the resources necessary to carry out such
large-scale operations is highly problematic and often unsuccessful.</p><p >In many other cases, funds are raised, the impact of
these investments on local public budgets is typically high, and there is an
obvious opportunity cost associated with them.Many urban megaprojects form the
centerpiece of revitalization plans in their respective cities.Under the attractive perception of
"connecting" cities and regions to the global economy, local
politicians often over-promote the potential of the project.</p><p >The global rhetoric of urban planners and leaders and the
image of renewal aimed at generating investment in cities and regions contrasts
with the limited capacity of cities to attract and secure foreign capital
investment.Many supposedly
"global" megaprojects have only a local or regional scope, an
indication of the many contradictions inherent in most urban regeneration plans
based on re-qualifications and new land uses, asFainstein(2001)has pointed out.</p><p >The multiple risks of megaprojects and the uncertainty
associated with the possible financial viability of flagship projects severely
limit the prospects for success in their construction and development and, at
times, force developers to redesign initially ambitious projects.</p><p >The real impact of urban megaprojects has been magnified
beyond reason.In many cases,
megaprojects are not financially sound projects.</p><p >“They are driven
by ostentation and use the economy as a mask to create completely unproductive
businesses, built in urban areas that often cannot sustain them.Due to the large sums of money
involved, rent-seekingbehavioris common, as is the bias towards
optimism in forecasting results” (Flyvbjerget
al., 2014, 63).</p>
			</sec><sec>
			<title>2. Disorderly and Unruly Megaprojects</title>
				<p >There is a tension between plans and vision in the
development of megaprojects, the realization of iconic megaprojects and the
political pressure exerted by the economic and financial interests that sustain
the megaprojects.The positive or
negative urban effects of large development plans depend significantly on the
ability of strategic actors and participants to anticipate or at least adapt
and successfully manage thead
hocproblemsand collateral effects that are
frequent in long implementation processes (del Cerro Santamaría, 2013, 32).</p><p >Local-global logic, or the tensions between site
specificity versus global uniformity, are extremely influential in the design
and construction of urban mega-projects.</p><p >“In this process, contextual elements such as history and
local culture are important factors to interpret the architecture and to
ascribe a specific meaning (local, regional, national, global) to the
architectural practices used to build megaprojects and make them visible” (del
Cerro Santamaría, 2013, 29).</p><p >Most megaprojects are physically and socially autonomous,
isolated and disconnected from the context of the host city;therefore, they promote a similar
urban form regardless of the host city, an urban form that encapsulates a very
narrow definition of urban life and culture (Harris, 2017).The resemblance of most megaprojects
to conventional global city images is suitable for some city marketing purposes,
but clearly not all.</p><p >The paradox of the star architect is that he aims to
create unique and unrepeatable places and yet we are witnessing “the
multiplication of aesthetically striking cultural facilities and similar
corporate headquarters all over the world with the effect of homogenizing
cities.Ultimately, there is
always the question of how to distinguish one megaproject from others and how
to uniquely identify it with the particular city where it is built” (del Cerro
Santamaría, 2013, 39).</p><p >2.1.
Management</p><p >Projects are often led by inexperienced planners and
managers who “continue to change throughout the long project cycles that apply
to megaprojects, leaving leadership weak.Decision-making,
planning and management are often multi-stakeholder processes involving
multiple stakeholders, public and private, with conflicting interests”
(Flyvbjerg, 2014, 76).</p><p >Furthermore, technology and designs are often
non-standard, leading to an "exclusivity bias" among planners and
managers, who tend to view their projects as unique, preventing learning from
other projects.</p><p >“Often there is an overcommitment to a certain project
concept at an early stage, resulting in a 'lock' or 'catch', making the
analysis of alternatives unlikely and leading toad hoccommitmentsat later stages” (Flyvbjerg,2014, 54).</p><p >The achievement and delivery of the megaproject is a
high-risk stochastic activity, with overexposure to so-called “black swans”,
that is, extreme events with massively negative results.</p><p >“Managers tend to ignore this, treating projects as if
they really exist in a deterministic Newtonian world of cause, effect, and
control.Statistical evidence
shows that such complexity and unplanned events are often overlooked, leaving
budget and time contingencies not adequately addressed.As a consequence, misinformation about
costs,schedules, benefits and
risks is the norm throughout project development and decision making.The result is cost overruns, delays,
and profit gaps that undermine project viability during construction and
development” (Flyvbjerg, 2014, 67).</p><p >2.2.
Economic Impact</p><p >In most megaprojects, global economic positioning and
marketing towards a globally mobile elite prevails over concern for local
issues (Harris, 2017).</p><p >“Members of the
economic and political elites and their local affiliates can be particularly
innovative in creating enclaves that protect them and their families from the
worst effects of mega-projects and in spreading the culture-ideology of
consumerism in which the new forms of global urbanity rest.Urban megaprojects and emblematic
buildings, according to this point of view, are a powerful tool to transmit the
consumerist values ​​and practices that sustain capitalist globalization” (del
Cerro Santamaría, 2013, 46).</p><p >There are examples of megaprojects where broad benefits
have been achieved, combining international economic positioning with wealth
distribution strategies.</p><p >“These cases show the existence of a Keynesian state
model, with the aim of counteracting the cycles and damaging effects of the
market, guaranteeing collective well-being and reducing inequalities.Two areas offer perhaps the most
transferable opportunities: (1) housing, where increasingly significant
portions of residential land are allocated to affordable housing;and (2) transportation, where therezonedvalueof the land is used to finance public
transportation infrastructure for other parts of the city, as well as for the
project itself” (Harris, 2017, 71).</p><p >2.3.
Context</p><p >Not all cities are well positioned to beput on
the mapby means of a megaproject, especially those of the second or third
level in terms of population that are outside the main routes and flows of
people and commerce, or lack a metropolitan or regional government capable of
financing itself.The expected success
of the megaprojects reinforces the influence of the promoters, who will agree
to negotiate only in places with obvious financial and location advantages.</p><p >Cities and regions around the world follow, in part,
their own specific logic of development: “each has specific reasons that help
explain the decline, and each may require localized strategies for
redevelopment.Applying some of
the ingredients of revitalization in most cities may be inevitable due to the
rapid and uncritical adoption of political discourses from the center to the
periphery, but hoping to repeat the success of a city in another context can be
very difficult” (del Cerro Santamaría, 2013, 49).</p><p >However, these conditions are more likely to be found in
larger cities that are already on the map.“In
many places, mega-projects become spectacular global image campaigns due not
only to possibly unrepeatable buildings, but also to local economic and
political conditions.Far from
being the triggers and drivers of revitalization, megaprojects sometimes follow
urban revitalization processes” (del Cerro Santamaría, 2013, 54).</p><p >As a consequence of the important role played by local
political conditions, “the successful replication of megaprojects elsewhere may
require a careful analysis of existing preconditions and even a re-examination
of the validity of the strategy when the political-economic climate changes.This need to pay attention to context
when designing urban policies can represent a structural obstacle to the
successful development of megaprojects in many cities” (del Cerro Santamaría,
2013,
38).</p><p >2.4.
Resistance</p><p >Dissidence, protest, and resistance against urban
megaprojects do not occur frequently, “but can be successful when they do, with
the effect of immobilizing the megaproject and defeating the plans of urban
promoters and leaders, or at least forcing its modification.While the ambitions of urban elites
contribute to presenting large projects as indispensable, global networks also
help to explain why anti-megaproject movements can evolve from localized local
protests over land abuse to large social movements with transnational ties”
(del Cerro Santamaría, 2013, 61).</p><p >2.5.
Evaluation</p><p >The notion of "multiple success factors" and
"success criteria" is not new in the field of project management and,
in fact, is one of the most discussed topics by specialists.</p><p >“It is
increasingly important to evaluate projects and their impacts at different
times and based on multiple criteria in order to fully assess their
performance.Success is often
driven by political and / or power-related factors.Due to the strongly political nature
of stakeholders throughout the supply chain and their different underlying
goals, the success factors commonly considered no longer appear to be
sufficient.This configuration
requires innovative governance solutions that align the interests of different
participants in a complex environment with a large number of key players”
(Harris, 2017,
32).</p><p >2.6.
Sustainability</p><p >One of the main topics in relation to future research on
megaprojects is the challenges of sustainability and “how megaprojects will
cope with external industrial influences such as digitization and automation.Sustainability usually refers to
environmental practices.In
megaprojects, it is appropriate to use a broader definition, which includes
concepts of economic, social and institutional sustainability” (del Cerro
Santamaría, 2019, 9).</p><p >A megaproject can be defined as sustainable “if it is
planned and executed to take into account the capacity, suitability,
resilience, diversity and balance of its urban ecosystem.We consider sustainability as an
organic process involving the environment, the economy and the community form
and efficiency (environmental factors in design, architecture, engineering and
construction) andthepolicies (plans and urban practices
that explicitly aim to maintain and improve the economic well-being of
citizens)” (del Cerro Santamaría, 2019, 12).</p><p >2.7.
New Cities (NewTowns) in
South Korea</p><p >The reconfiguration of urban spaces through the
construction of megaprojects is evident in the case ofnewtowns, as is the case of South
Korea.Although this type of
construction is less frequent today in that country for various reasons, the
case of two new successful cities on the outskirts of Seoul,BundangandIlsan, shows that, in South Korea, despite
decentralization andPolitical
and governmentalneoliberalization, and the slowdown of itsmiraculouseconomic growth, the country still
employs the concept of new cities in its megaprojects.</p><p >South Korea has been planning and building new cities for
reasons not strictly residential.For
example, to revitalize backward regions, South Korea has decided to create the
cities ofSaemangeumandSejong, rather than revitalize existing
regions.In order to better
compete in the global economy, the Asian country has even chosen to build a newglobal city(Songdo) from scratch, instead of
building iconic mega-projects within other existing cities.</p><p >South Korea's costly and risky endeavor to develop new
populations to solve its problems is understandable when one considers its past
experiences of success:BundangandIlsan, built on the outskirts of Seoul in
1989 to alleviate the housing shortage, are generally considered as the first
symbols of the new urban developments in the country.In fact,BundangandIlsanwere the first projects in South Korea
to be formally dubbed "new cities" (shin-doshi), and their
impact on subsequent construction has been significant.Its impact is not limited to South
Korea.Many developing countries
viewBundangandIlsanas examples of new urban districts, or
new cities, because of the surprising speed with which they were built and
their ability to attract private capital to finance them.</p><p >More than a dozen countries have signed contracts withthe developer ofBundangandIlsanto import these new developments.The importance ofBundangandIlsanand their possible influence on the
construction of new cities, both domestic and international,should therefore be underlined in
orderto understand why these new
cities have been considered a success.This
also allows us to obtain some perspective to understand if these new projects
can obtain similar results today in South Korea, and if they can work equally
in other developing countries (Joo, 2013).</p><p >2.8.
Kuala Lumpur: the Travels of
Megaprojects</p><p >For more than two decades, research on urban megaprojects
has focused on competitive efforts tosellvenues.Megaprojects are not just large-scale
sites;they also seek to be focuses
of interest capable of creating a symbolic image visible on a global scale of
cities and even nation-states.A
significant number of researchers have studied the use of megaprojects as a way
to produce a globally marketable image of the city.However, much less attention has been
paid to evaluating thesuccessof these imaging strategies, the
channels that are used to circulate visual images, and the extent to which they
are consumed.</p><p >This is the case in Kuala Lumpur (KL), Malaysia.High-profile megaprojects in KL since
the 1990s have been the subject of analysis in various studies, but, to date,
there has been no concerted effort to trace the global effects of such a
re-imaging process through thejourneyof visual images of megaprojects.Based on KL megaprojects, such as the
KLCC in the city center (which includes thePetronas
Towers), we can consider a series of means through which tourist places
circulate: films and television,souvenirs,
planning models, references at the height of the building, commercial
advertising and even academic practices.</p><p >The global repositioning of Kuala Lumpur has required
considerable imaginative, discursive and symbolic investment.Some nation states in many regions of
the world have appliedvisualizationstrategiesto capture global audiences.In the Asia Pacific region in the
1990s, such strategies frequently materialized in urban mega-projects with a
particular penchant for building skyscrapers.</p><p >The power of published images of a building, especially
on television, is potentially greater than the visual experience of the
building itself, since the latter is limited to a much smaller number of
viewers.The KLCC project - and
thePetronas Towersin particular - was destined to become
a "cultural landmark" for Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia, placing the city
and the nation on the "world map."Since
it was announced by Prime MinisterMahathirMohamadin 1991, it was clear that such an
investment was being made to travel, to be on the map, and to be seen from afar
(Bunnell, 2013).</p><p >2.9.
Monstrous Hybrids in American
Urbanism</p><p >Megaprojects are proliferating around the world, and they
are also growing rapidly in the heart of every city in the United States in the
form of stadiums, convention centers, and casinos.The economic arguments against these
structures have proven fruitless, as megaprojects are driven vigorously by the
local elite and growth coalitions and irreducible to criticism.In both Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
and Detroit, Michigan, historic buildings have recently been demolished,
streets opened, and pedestrianized neighborhoods removed in the name of
economic growth.</p><p >These projects, monstrous hybrids, can be understood as
entities that represent a negative combination in the appropriation of
commercial and governmental responsibilities.The
proliferation and metastasis of megaprojects in the city center indicates a
pathological increase in local government arrogance mixed with monopoly and
opportunistic trade.Unless a
reform of local economic policy is carried out, the negative impact of urbanism
based on propagating megaprojects can be moderated by a more intelligent
location of these structures, away from active urban areas, in large and
accessible places from the center, but they do not visually dominate the neighborhood
or its surroundings.</p><p >With respect to their downtown megaprojects, both cities
represent two of the worst urban design scenarios, despite having numerous
assets elsewhere.ThePhiladelphia ConventionCenterrepresentsthe worst case of
"conglomerate" cities, in which a megaproject is inserted directly
into the dense structure of the historic center, with active street life,
abundant businesses, housing and organizations.The convention center is a bad case,
but the situation in Detroit is far worse: It is one of the most extreme
examples of the deterioration of the city center, which is being eaten up in
its entirety by megaprojects, leaving a few fragments of its old structure like
islands in an ocean of asphalt (Ryan, 2013).</p><p >2.10.
Railway Megaprojects:Stuttgart
21</p><p >Since its introduction in the early 1990s, Stuttgart 21
was an extremely controversial project.Although
without being uniform in their messages, purposes or methods, opposition groups
and civic associations directly confronted the bold proposals of Stuttgart 21,
demonstrating that cities are spaces in which growth-oriented neoliberal
restructuring is most vividly expressed, but also where it is most fiercely
confronted.Civic associations
and the defense of the environment opposed the basic premises of the
development plan from its inception.TheUmkehrStuttgart(Devuelvan Stuttgart) group was
created to organize the opposition and to actively participate in the
decision-making process.</p><p >Headed by the BUND, the largest environmental non-governmental
organization, the alternative transport club VCD and a recently established
citizens' group calledLebenin Stuttgart,UmkehrStuttgartorganized a multifaceted campaign
employing various forms of protest, including mobilizations in the streets, to
support legal actions that promoted the development of alternative proposals.Opponents questioned every aspect of
Stuttgart 21: from its alleged efficiency to its financing, to the alleged
environmental sustainability of transport infrastructure and its impact on
urban development.</p><p >There were general criticisms about the cost of the
project.Even the German Federal
Court of Auditors qualified the assessment of the real cost of the project as
unacceptable.Critics also argued
that the project's cost and risk were disproportionately subordinated to the
public sector, as Deutsche Bank, the main private funder, significantly reduced
its financial exposure over the years.Public
investment in the project affected investments in local and regional
transportation elsewhere, posing a threat to existing services.In addition, the transportation
priorities of the project and the announced improvements to the Stuttgart rail
crossing were questioned (Novy&amp;Peters, 2013).</p><p >2.11.
The Afghan Ring Road
Megaproject</p><p >The great bypass highway under construction in
Afghanistan connects almost all major cities in the country (Kabul,LashkarGah,Herat,
Mazar-e-Sharif).The question is to identify the actors
and institutions responsible for the construction of the ring road and to determine
the reasons for carrying out a massive construction project (a 5,000-kilometer
highway) in a place of conflict.The
main participants in the project, civilian government agencies, the military,
promoters and banks, have specific reasons for participating in a megaproject
of such magnitude.</p><p >The main reasons for the territorial restructuring that
the road produces are the desire to satisfy the world's energy needs using the
energy supplies of Central Asia (capitalist globalization at its best geostrategic
expression), and the military need to efficiently transport goods through the
limited regional systems available in South and Central Asia.It is, therefore, a geostrategic
project.The bypass was conceived
as a ring, a unique shape that could serve to maintain US / NATO control within
the borders of Afghanistan and which could ultimately pass into the hands of
the Afghan state.</p><p >However, the construction of this mega-project, and the
safety strategies that the road has enabled, suggest that “it embodies a form
of "global conflict" that encourages close connections between local
powers and transnational powers while ignoring the state. Afghan completely.What implications does this dual
strategy of building and dismantling the Afghan nation have for international
development? The strategy constitutes a "mega-megaproject", a reform
package that is based on the physical transformation of the Afghan
infrastructure to win the trust of the population.The Afghan Highway allows one to
examine the ways in which even pre-existing structures within a nation have
been modified to fit a mega-project-based strategy” (Miller, 2013, 45).</p><p >The scalar implications of this megaproject can be seen
by focusing on the political and social aspects that have shaped the use of
this highway.The first scalar
implication is local, although supported by global forces: theconflict economy oftolls for local militias.The second scalar implication is
global, but sustained by local forces: the physical manifestation of regional
geopolitical interests in energy resources through the financing and
construction of roads.The Afghan
state has not played a significant role in any of these power structures,
suggesting that the scale of the 'nation' is irrelevant to many of the economic
and physical processes that occur on the Afghan border (Miller, 2013).</p><p >2.12.
Controversy and Defeat: the Mexico
City Airport</p><p >Can megaprojects completely fail despite the backing of
the government and pro-growth coalitions?This
seemed to occur in Mexico City, where some of the political and economic
conditions that can lead to the failure of an urban megaproject have arisen.The case of the frustrated attempt to
build a new international airport in the metropolitan area of ​​Mexico City
shows the nature of the social and political alliances that were created to
stop the airport project and the great socio-spatial, political, economic and
economic conditions. institutional institutions under which these alliances
were forged.</p><p >Several relevant factors led to the failure of this
megaproject: “the divisions within and between the political classes, and of
these with the citizens, driven by democratization, decentralization and
globalization;the enabling and
participatory power of the local State vis-à-vis the national one that
sustained the citizen opposition;and
the importance of cultural identity, historical alliances, and geographic
location in mobilizing a wide range of local, national, and international
alliances to fight the project” (Davis &amp; Flores, 2013, 56).</p><p >The case of the failed Mexican airport suggests “that the
historical and institutional legacies of national and urban development in
Latin America have created bureaucratic ambiguities and tensions over who is
ultimately responsible for the development of large infrastructure projects in
countries in the process of democratic transition” (Davis &amp; Flores, 2013,
65).</p><p >This same urban, political and institutional history has
also deprived planning authorities and private developers of previous
experiences regarding the role of citizen participation in the development of
an urban megaproject.</p><p >With these legacies, countries like Mexico “have not yet
developed institutional structures and processes that improve legitimacy and
allow success in the construction of megaprojects subject to strong citizen
opposition.In this sense, the
failure in the construction of the airport megaproject in Mexico City reflects
a moment of precariousness in the political and economic development of the
country, as well as the strength of the opposition that developed around the
project” (Davis &amp; Flores, 2013, 68).</p>
			</sec><sec>
			<title>3. Infrastructure and Environmental Challenges in China</title>
				<p >Infrastructure and megaprojects have opened the door to
socio-economic development in China. While the socioeconomic results are
indisputable, China’s performance in the area of environmentally sustainable
development leaves room for improvement. According to the PRC Ministry of
Ecology and Environment (PRCMEE), “two-thirds of China’s lakes have chemical
deficiencies caused by pollution. As a result of pollution and increasing
consumption, two-thirds of China’s cities are short of potable water. Air is
heavily polluted across the northern heavy industry belt from Shanxi to
Liaoning provinces and along the heavily industrialized east coast. Many
polluted industrial sites will require extensive soil remediation before they
will again be fit for human use” (PRCMEE, 2016, 13).</p><p >According to a New York Times report, China is
responsible for 47% of the world’s coal burning, which is more than all other
countries in the world combined. As a result, “respiratory diseases that are
directly related to air pollution are currently the leading cause of death in
China, according to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). In addition to some of the
world’s worst air pollution, China also has many waterways that are highly
polluted. According to the Economist, more than 50% of China’s surface water is
not fit for human consumption, whereas approximately 60% of the groundwater
under Chinese cities is considered to be severely polluted" (Watkins et
al, 2018, B3).</p><p >3.1.
Energy</p><p >According to the World Bank, “Electricity production in
China doubles nearly every 10 years. China now generates 18 percent of all
electricity globally, only slightly less power than the United States. China’s
non-fossil fuel electrical power sources are still overwhelmingly nuclear and
hydro (96 percent combined), according to the World Bank. The more difficult
target to achieve will be 20 percent renewable power production by 2020. Despite
rapid growth, wind and solar energy sources still make up less than one
percentage point of total electricity production in China. Since solar power is
still more expensive to produce than electricity from coal-fired turbines, the
government offers subsidies either for capital investment or operations, but
neither subsidy is sufficient to break-even under current conditions” (World
Bank, 2018, 25). </p><p >In addition to renewable power generation, there is a
growing market for energy service company (ESCO) projects, “which can help to
reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. ESCO projects typically
finance the purchase of new energy-efficient equipment through projected
savings on future fuel bills in comparison with old or energy-hungry machinery.
While the World Bank and many smaller “green funds” have already entered this
market, many local investors are hesitant, since they find the five-to-10 year
payback period too long. This is one factor contributing to opportunities for
foreign energy savings companies with local partners” (Bachman &amp; Burnett,
2012, 35).</p><p >3.2.
Water and Wastewater</p><p >Future efforts to increase water sector performance
should adopt a more integrated approach. “The different components of urban
water systems—water, wastewater, and stormwater—are often handled by different
government organizations with different, sometimes competing agendas.
Integrated water resource management can be used to match water quality to
water uses, improve treatment cost-effectiveness, and raise the quality of
discharged water to environmentally safe levels. China’s water industry will
open up for reverse osmosis, membranes, and other advanced treatment
technologies that minimize energy inputs and simplify operations” (Southerland,
2017, 43). </p><p >3.3.
Transportation</p><p >Transit-oriented development (TOD) is key in the
development of Chinese cities. To be sure, land use and density factors are not
yet considered systematically during design. However, “many cities retrofit
their zoning codes after subway construction to allow development to cluster
around transit stops. With the right land use mix, this offers the possibility
of higher use of non-motorized transport. At least 13 Chinese cities currently
have one or more subway lines under operation, 54 lines covering 1,700 km.
Another 76 lines, or an additional 1,600 km, are under construction. The target
is 40 subways systems by 2020 covering about 7,000 km. At this pace and scale,
TOD is poised to make a big difference in the long-term sustainability of urban
living” (Luo et al, 2017, 41).</p><p >3.4.
Desertification</p><p >According to Smith, “China is also dealing with rampant
soil erosion and desertification, which is a type of land degradation that is a
result of previously fertile soil transforming into arid land due to poor
agricultural practices and land management, as well as extreme climate change.
Both desertification and soil erosion cause blinding dust storms and
river-clogging mud that have battered Chinese cities located near the edge of
the Gobi Desert. According to the WWF, desertification has already swept over
30% of China’s land mass. Since 1978, the Chinese has followed guidelines set
by the Three-North Shelter Forest Program, otherwise known as the Great Green
Wall, which involved the construction of what is now over 66 billion trees that
are used to block the path of the Gobi’s storms. Despite this afforestation
project, the desert’s expansion continues to affect various surrounding cities”
(Smith, 2018, 32).</p><p >And Schwärzel argues that, “As towns continue to get
swept under sand as a result of these storms, the Chinese government is forced
to move affected populations away from degraded lands. In fact, between 2003
and 2008, over 650,000 people who were previously living in China’s Inner
Mongolia province were forced to resettle in other cities. An even more
concerning fact is that these sand dunes are forming only about 44 miles away
from Beijing at a pace of almost 2 miles each year. To prevent the capital city
from being submerged in sand, the Chinese government must investigate new and
creative ways in which natural ecosystems can be restored” (Schwärzel, 2017,
21).</p><p >3.5.
Sustainability Challenges in
China</p><p >One of the factors contributing to the complex
essentially complex nature of sustainability is that, in conceiving and presenting
the goals of preservingsustainable strategies,sustainability
appears as interdependent on the dimensions of entrepreneurship, innovation and
competitiveness of economies.Indeed, the goal that is presented to us in
the majority view on sustainability is “green capitalism,” that is, nota
sustainable global societywith clearlyestablishedlimits to
growth, but rather the sustainability of the
informationand knowledgeeconomy, to which reformers and
planners addmore or less
ambitiouscommitmentsto the environment (Meadows, Randers et al,
2004).The Chinese case illustrates
thepossibilities,contradictions and limitations of this approach
(World Bank, 2018).</p><p >In early2019, the Chinese government approved three
sustainable development zones,Shenzhen, Guilin and
Taiyuan,whichform the leading axis in Chinese innovation
(Ness, 2018). These zones are implementing the 2030
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. </p><p >“Shenzhen is China’s innovation engine. This zone will
integrate technologies in sewage treatment, waste utilization, ecological
restoration, and artificial intelligence to solve issues from resource
management to pollution. Guilin will focus on innovations that tackle
desertification, creating solutions that can be replicated by other regions
facing the threat of encroaching deserts. Taiyuan, targeting air and water pollution,
will foster innovative solutions that can be replicated by regions relying on
resource extraction” (XinhuaNet, 2018, 22).</p><p >Shenzhen, Guilin and Taiyuanfunction
aslargesustainableinnovation
districts(orinnodistricts). In these newly developed urban areas,
achieving sustainabilityusually meansachieving
environmentalsustainability. This goal by itself, however, does not
guaranteethe sustainability ofinnodistrict development in the
knowledge economy(Carnes, 2016).This objective must be pursued in
acomprehensiveand holistic way(United NationsSDG2030),such
that it is integrated in innodistricts,
anyinfrastructureprojects,industrial corridors
foradvanced manufacturing,factories of the futureand
otherdevelopmentprojects. It ought to take into account:</p><p >(1) environmental sustainability, promoted by sustainable
infrastructure and the creation of "sustainable development zones"; </p><p >(2) sustainability in the design and planning ofthe
development project;</p><p >(3) sustainability in management;</p><p >(4) institutional sustainability, aimed at the
integration of allrelevantstakeholders, and </p><p >(5) socioeconomic sustainability, based on a strategic
alignment of theproject'sobjectiveswith urban, regional and
even national policies. </p><p >Complex sustainability, therefore, isan organic
process that includes the environment, the economy and the community; “form and
efficiency (environmental factors in design, architecture, engineering and
construction) and policies (plans and urban practices that aim explicitly
tomaintain and improve thesocial
andeconomicwell-beingof citizens).Thus adevelopment
projectcan be defined as sustainable if it is planned and implemented to
take into account the capacity,adaptability, resilience, diversity and
balance oftheecosystemwhere it is located and of which
itconstitutes a symbiotic element” (del Cerro Santamaría, 2019).</p><p >Despitethis systematic and holistic
approach,the limitations of many of the sustainability strategies
underway today persist.Such limitations are seen in the fact that,
tothe extent thatcountriesshift into the transition
fromurban property investment and financesto science, knowledge and
innodistricts, what we see is that sustainability strategies,
includingenvironmental sustainability,are conceived as a central
elementinthe positioning of the market.</p><p >“As cities and countries climb the industrial value
ladder and expand their service sector to cater to growing domestic demand,
environmental quality will become central to achieving sustainable economic
growth. Urban residents in the more sophisticated markets are already putting a
substantial price premium on high-quality urban environment
(i.e.,ecological or"sustainable"). To attract the right
labor pool, cities will need to raise their game further” (World Bank, 2018,
33).</p><p >Thus, in global cities like New York, London or Sydney,
among others, certain strategies aimed at sustainability can have the perverse
effect of gentrification (Curran, 2017), which starkly
revealsthe problemsof anthropocentric sustainability. From this
perspective,the planet continues to be considered exclusivelya
resource for human use.</p>
			</sec><sec>
			<title>4. Towards Urban Prosperity </title>
				<p >Any fairly rigorous analysis of the impact of urban
megaprojects on the economic growth of cities yields a result that generates
skepticism: megaprojects act as supposed catalysts, but do not directly achieve
important economic transformations in the cities where they are built.If spectacular architecture and urban
mega-projects are not enough to positively transform a struggling urban
economy, how can cities and regions successfully implement policies that, in
times of globalization, bring economic benefits to citizens? </p><p >The answer lies at the intersection of political economy,
the historical and socio-economic context, and the reconsideration of urban
boundaries as an integral part of broader regional networks of production and
trade.Although globalization
offers new dimensions linked to the development of megaprojects and emblematic
projects, it is also revealed-firstly-in
the formation of networks, flows and economic nodes that link cities with the
world economy.Therefore, any
fundamental analysis of contemporary urban development must focus on the
economic globalization of cities and regions, the patterns of transnational
finance and foreign trade.And
thus, aligning the goals of megaprojects with regional and national policies
has often proven to be a good decision.</p><p >In many cases, the pillars of the recent evolution of
cities to embrace the requirements of globalization were already present in the
golden years of urban transformation: industrialization based on exports and
the transnational reach of the local and regional financial bourgeoisies.This recent era of globalization,
therefore, is not a new phenomenon in many cities (except, perhaps, for its
scale, scope, and complexity), but rather a new cycle in a secular trend for
cities to join. global economic circuits.Thus,
despite the exacerbated pace of recent financial globalization and its
spectacular technological infrastructure, its mechanisms and trajectories are
not new.</p><p >As GiovanniArrighi,
the late Italian economist,argues,
“much of what is known as “globalization” has in fact been a recurring trend of
world capitalism since modern times.This
recurrence makes the dynamics and likely outcomes of current transformations
more predictable than they would be if globalization were as novel a phenomenon
as many observers think” (Arrighi, 1997,
26).</p><p >Without a doubt, the most spectacular expansion of the
last two decades, and the strongest evidence used by the arsenal of defenders
of the globalization thesis as a recent novelty, has not been in FDI or world
trade, but in financial markets worldwide.Since
1980 the total value of financial assets has grown two and a half times faster
than the aggregate GDP of all advanced industrial economies.</p><p >“And the volume of transactions in currencies, bonds and
stocks has increased five times faster.In
the absence of this explosive growth in world financial markets, we would
probably not be talking about globalization today, and certainly not as a
departure from the ongoing process of world market reconstruction launched
under the hegemony of the United States after World War II.The idea of ​​globalization was
identified from the beginning with the idea of ​​intense interstate competition
for increasingly volatile capital and a consequent subordination of most states
to the dictates of transnational corporations.Urban megaprojects emerged as a
prominent vehicle for providing cities with an edge in the growing competition
for capital and investment” (Arrighi, 1997,
31).</p><p >This vision of financial globalization and the
restructuring of States caused by global processes has had consequences for the
planning of policies associated with the construction of urban mega-projects that
want to be successful.A first
consequence has been the transformation of urban planning frameworks, processes
and tools.The agencies and
administrative procedures that implement planning policies have been integrated
within the variable organizational structures of the States.However, in a flexible and
post-Fordistor 'disorganized'economic framework, there is a clear
trend towards endowing megaprojects with their own strategic spatial plans, as
mentioned above, which no longer depend on state regulations but not even of
the urban regulations in operation.</p><p >Such organizational structures determine the levels of
the political-administrative machinery to which planning powers are attributed
and the political dynamics through which these powers are exercised.Administrative scales are further
relativized with new policies and regulations promulgated at different levels,
and we have been witnessing a reordering (orreterritorialization)
of the State in an explicit hierarchy of jurisdictions.Despite everything, new forms of
relationships between administrative levels continue to emerge, which are
necessary to implement strategic planning policies, since disaggregating the
objectives of megaprojects from regional or national goals is not desirable or
convenient with a view to achieving results.</p><p >Therefore,megaprojects,
supposed catalysts of urban development, “can also be used at the national
level as tools to advance urban and regional policy.In countries with active national
urban policies towards urban development, megaprojects are often planned at the
national level to address housing problems, redirect urban development to
specific areas, or trigger economic development in specific sectors.In such cases, projects are integrated
with broader economic and social policies and tend to reflect broader economic
trends as well” (del Cerro Santamaría, 2019,
8).</p><p >The role that urban megaprojects can assume as
instruments of national policy also depends directly on economic cycles and
political programs.Megaprojects
can become an instrumental way of increasing public spending in periods of
private sector withdrawal, as a way to maintain or boost aggregate demand.Public spending through urban
megaprojects can create conditions for productive investments and have an
important multiplier effect in terms of social return on investment and
increase in GDP.</p><p >Finally, “when studying megaprojects in connection with
urban growth coalitions, we can ask ourselves whether the form of development
represented by these large projects simply legitimizesgrowthmachinesand commercial interests, or whether
this phenomenon can be analyzed from the prism of the role played by state
actors and agencies in urban restructuring” (del Cerro Santamaría, 2019, 7).</p><p >The study of megaprojects shows that they can function as
pro-growth strategies, but are usually less decisive as direct development
mechanisms with a synergy of their own than as symbols or catalysts for such
development and the possible economic improvement that it entails.</p><p >The study of urban megaprojects, emblems of global
capitalism, helps us understand the dynamics of the economic system and urban
development at different geographical scales.Urban
megaprojects have multiplied in the last two decades throughout the world and
their transnational deployment continues to be one of the most important
phenomena for understanding a variety of socio-economic processes of global
reach in this 21st century.We
remain convinced of the advantages of a multidisciplinary approach to
understanding the complexities of urban megaprojects and the contradictions
inherent in globalization and contemporary urban development.</p>
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